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The shift toward protectionism became 
more pronounced in 2018 and 2019. 
Two trends in particular may have 
wide- ranging repercussions: (1) 
the considerable increase in trade 
tensions in 2018 among the major world 
economies, combined with a marked 
increase in the number of disputes 
submitted to the dispute settlement 
mechanism of the World Trade 
Global environment
The global trade picture changed 
dramatically in late 2016 and early 2017. 
Protectionism resurfaced, fostered by a 
challenging Doha Round and following 
on the heels of the British referendum 
supporting Brexit from the European Union 
and the new United States administration.
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To better understand the likely impacts for Latin America and the Caribbean 
of developments in global trade, we modeled a set of four scenarios to see 
how escalating trade tensions would affect the region’s economies and the 
potential for a regional response to mitigate possible negative impacts. This 
article reviews the results of that modeling exercise.
Organization; and (2) the measures 
taken by the United States to increase 
import tariffs, particularly on China, 
which have triggered reprisals and 
counter-reprisals.
In Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC), these trends are expected to 
affect exporters of food products in two 
ways. First, the ripple effect from the 
reduction of US food exports to China 
(the United States is the world’s largest 
food exporter) could open up new 
opportunities; and second, an economic 
slowdown in China and/or the United 
States could reduce the global demand 
for commodities.
Latin American countries should 
be monitoring the US–China trade 
relationship, given the important role 
these economies play through trade in 
the LAC region. Figure 1 shows that 
China accounts for 13 percent of total 
agricultural exports from LAC, and the 
United States accounts for 21 percent. 
On the import side, the United States 
accounts for 44 percent of LAC’s 
agricultural imports while agricultural 
imports from China are insignificant.
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Figure 1: LAC agricultural trade: China and the US as key partners 
(average 2014–2016)
Source: Authors, computations based on COMTRADE
Short term versus long 
term
The current tit-for-tat game between 
the United States and its trading 
partners is expected to generate a mix 
of opportunities and threats for LAC 
countries, both in the short and long 
term, as indicated by Bouët and Laborde 
(2018) in an initial assessment of these 
trade tensions.
The escalation of tariffs and reprisals 
between the United States and China 
could create short-term gains for 
Mexico and other Latin American 
countries. An increase in the prices of 
some imports for Chinese or American 
consumers could allow LAC countries 
to replace either US or Chinese exports 
on their reciprocal markets. However, 
opportunities will depend on the specific 
product, the distribution channels, the 
ability to supply the necessary quantity, 
and the extent to which the cost 
increase for Chinese and US products is 
transferred to the final consumer.
In the longer term, these short-terms 
gains could easily be reversed by 
dynamic effects. Exporters punished by 
the tariffs may dump their exports on 
third markets or lobby for subsidies from 
their national governments, responses 
that would increase global market 
distortions. Also, the “fake” comparative 
advantages created by punitive tariffs 
would disappear when the trade wars 
end, leaving unfruitful investments. 
Resulting uncertainties in the global 
economy would reduce demand for 
many products and trigger more 
protectionist policies.
Heterogeneity within the 
region
While we understand the importance of 
these two partners for LAC countries, 
we should not forget the high level of 
heterogeneity within the region. LAC 
countries are engaged with these partners 
to varying degrees and specialize in 
different export products. Their exposure 
to changes in tariffs in various markets 
and products therefore varies. Indeed, 
when tariffs are increased in trade wars, 
an opportunity may be created for an 
uninvolved country to export to a country 
involved in the trade war.
Figure 2 shows a clustering of countries 
by major export commodity basket (by 
value). The Mercosur countries are major 
exporters of soy, cereals, and animal 
protein. Chile, Ecuador, French Guiana, 
and Peru primarily export fruits and fishery 
products. Coffee, sugar, and fruits are 
important exports for Colombia, and fruits 
and cereals are key for Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, and 
Venezuela. The major food exports of 
El Salvador and Guatemala are coffee 
and cereals. Nicaragua is the only 
country primarily exporting coffee and 
animal protein. This clustering provides 
important information for analyzing the 
heterogeneous effects of trade tensions in 
LAC countries.
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We also consider the export structure 
of LAC countries to see which are 
competitive in the same goods as either 
the United States or China, and hence 
could replace the imports of the country 
involved in the trade tension.
One tool for analyzing how competitiveness 
affects the impact of trade tensions in 
countries not directly involved in the conflict 
is the Export Similarity Index (ESI) (Finger 
and Kreinin 1979), which measures the 
similarity between exports of any two 
countries to a third market.1  Figure 3 
illustrates the ESI for LAC country 
agricultural exports to the US market as 
compared to China’s exports, and LAC 
agricultural exports to China’s market 
as compared to US exports. An index 
value close to one suggests that the two 
countries analyzed are perfect competitors 
(very similar) in the third market. An index 
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Figure 2: Major export commodity basket 
by country (by value)
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (https://wits.world- bank.org/).
1 The index is based on the share of each product in each country’s total exports and is calculated as the sum 
of the minimum value for each product:
 where ESI(ab,c) refers to the export similarity index of countries a and b in the common market (c), Xj(a,c) 
refers the exports of product j from country a to country c and similarly Xj(b,c) refers tothe exports of product j 
from country b to country c, ΣX(a,c) and ΣX(b,c) are total exports of country a and b to country c, respectively.
5value close to zero suggests that there 
is no competition at all between the two 
countries in this market.
Argentina and Brazil are similar to 
the United States in the Chinese 
agricultural market (as exporters of 
soy), according to the ESI, meaning 
they are very competitive with the 
United States. Looking at the Index for 
LAC and China on the US agricultural 
market, the numbers are both more 
homogeneous and smaller, meaning 
LAC is less competitive with China in the 
US agricultural market. Although Chile, 
Argentina, Jamaica, and Peru, like China, 
all sell aquaculture products (fish) and 
vegetables and fruits to the United States, 
the values are small.
In addition, the food trade balances of 
the LAC countries will also influence 
the impact of the trade tensions in their 
respective economies (Figure 4). For 
example, Argentina and Brazil, which have 
a large food trade surplus, will experience 
different impacts than the Caribbean, 
Belize, El Salvador, French Guiana, 
Panama, Suriname and Venezuela, which 
all have a food trade deficit.
Figure 3: Export Similarity Index
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (https:// wits.worldbank.org/).
Implications of trade 
tensions
The uncertain global trade situation makes 
it difficult to predict how things will develop 
in the coming months. We can envisage 
several possible scenarios, all with very 
different consequences for the global 
economy and political relations between 
countries. For our analysis, we selected 
the following four scenarios to represent 
the broad range of possible situations.
1. US vs. China—Status quo. Focuses 
on the economic consequences of the 
current trade tensions between the 
United States and China. This scenario 
is based on the state of trade disputes, 
including tariffs proposed and/or 
implemented by the US and Chinese 
governments up to December 2018 
and considers both agricultural and 
non-agricultural products.
2. Extended US trade tensions. 
Includes the measures listed in the 
first scenario, plus all other retaliation 
announced by the United States and 
China in the first half of 2019. It also 
includes the steel and aluminum tariff 
increases initiated by the United States 
and the retaliation measures taken by 
Canada, the European Union, India, 
Mexico, and Turkey.
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Figure 4: Food Trade Balance.
Fuente: World Integrated Trade Solution (https://wits.world- bank.org/).
73. Escalating trade wars. Explores the 
possibility of an escalation of trade 
wars between the United States, 
China, and other countries. This 
scenario mimics noncooperative 
behavior as seen during the global 
collapse episodes of the 1870s and 
1930s, and reflects a contagion 
scenario using the game theory 
approach developed in Bouët and 
Laborde (2018).
4. Intra-LAC integration. Considers 
the current trade tensions between 
the United States and China plus 
a mitigation strategy implemented 
by LAC countries that reduces 
transportation costs and increases 
intraregional integration.
While our analysis focuses on the 
agriculture and agribusiness sectors, it is 
important to capture both the agricultural 
and non-agricultural elements of the trade 
tensions. Tensions generated in non-
agricultural sectors (e.g., steel tariffs) 
could lead to retaliation in agriculture to 
hurt a partner’s main exports. Moreover, 
some macroeconomic constraints—both 
domestic (investments, labor mobility) 
and external (global growth, exchange 
rate)—are not specific to agriculture but 
directly affect the agricultural system 
(see a discussion of these issues in Díaz-
Bonilla, 2015).
Using the MIRAGRODEP2 model, we 
assess the impacts of these scenarios 
from 2018 to 2030 for various LAC 
countries in terms of a large number of 
economic variables including exports, 
imports, production, GDP, household 
consumption, and adjustment costs 
through changes in labor markets.
Figure 5 shows that the first round of 
rising protectionism (the “status quo” 
scenario) will benefit the LAC region’s 
exports, particularly agricultural exports 
(up 2.1 percent versus a 1.2 percent 
increase for non-agricultural goods). While 
agricultural exports benefit most at the 
regional level, impacts within the region 
are heterogenous. The Andean region 
will maintain a balanced profile, and the 
Mercosur countries will strengthen their 
agricultural exports and reduce industrial 
exports to benefit from more attractive 
commodity markets in China. But Central 
America, Mexico, and the Caribbean 
will increase their specialization in non-
agricultural products to occupy the space 
created by the trade restrictions on 
Chinese products in the US market.
2  MIRAGRODEP is a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model based on the MIRAGE (Modelling 
International Relationships under Applied General Equilibrium) model. In its standard version, MIRAGRODEP 
is a recursive, dynamic, multi-region, multisector model. In MIRAGRODEP, the government is explicitly 
modeled as different from private agents. Government income consists of taxes collected on production, on 
factors of production, on exports, on imports, on consumption, and on households’ income.
 For this study, the main source of data is the GTAP 10 version with 28 sectors and 33 regions (23 individual 
countries or subregions in LAC).
It is interesting to note that the 
agricultural exports of the Mercosur 
countries will increase by 3.6 percent, 
driven largely by an 11 percent increase 
in total soybean exports from LAC 
countries. However, exports of processed 
food products, including soybean oils 
and meals, will decline slightly due to the 
specific appetite of the Chinese market 
for beans. This will challenge the soybean 
processing strategy of some countries in 
the region, such as Argentina.
The continuation of the current trade 
conflict, captured by the “extended US 
trade tensions” scenario, will begin 
to neutralize these positive impacts. 
Overall agricultural exports will increase 
by less than 1 percent under this 
scenario as distortions in global markets 
increase. LAC products avoid direct tariff 
increases, and market opportunities 
expand for LAC products as they 
replace US products on additional third 
markets. However, LAC exports are also 
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Figure 5: LAC export value variations driven by trade war scenarios
Source: Authors, MIRAGRODEP CGE simulations.
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negatively affected by a contraction of 
global demand. For example, although 
the Mexican economy still benefits from 
preferential access to US markets, 
Mexican non-agricultural exports 
expand at a slower pace.
The “escalating trade wars” scenario, 
with large tariff increases, shows world 
trade in goods shrinking by 27 percent. 
LAC countries are slightly better off 
than the world average, with LAC 
non-agricultural exports decreasing 
by 24 percent and agricultural exports 
decreasing by only 17 percent. The 
resilience of agricultural exports to such 
shocks has been observed during the 
Great Trade Collapse of 2008, when 
world trade fell by about 30 percent. 
This resilience can be explained by the 
relative inelasticity of food demand and 
the fact that some importing countries 
cannot cut themselves off from food 
markets. Looking at LAC countries, it is 
evident that they cannot use high tariffs 
to strengthen their situation in a tit-for-tat 
game due to their limited market size, 
and will not disconnect themselves from 
world markets on the import side either. 
All subregions of LAC will suffer negative 
impacts but with slight variations. Two 
interesting findings should be highlighted: 
Mexico will suffer the largest impact (a 
26 percent decrease in agro-food exports 
and a 36 percent decrease for other 
industries), reflecting a tariff increase 
Mexico implements to retaliate against 
the United States and limit the terms of 
trade costs imposed by US policies. In 
the Mercosur region, agricultural exports 
will fall more than non-agricultural 
exports due to the bloc’s specialization 
in commodities that are relatively more 
sensitive to price variations.
The “intra-LAC integration” scenario 
shows the potential gains for LAC 
countries if they implement a mitigation 
strategy to address the current US–China 
trade tensions based on increasing 
regional integration—namely, by 
decreasing transportation costs and 
eliminating intraregional import tariffs. 
Under this scenario, LAC will see an 
increase of 5 percent in agro-food exports 
and another 4 percent increase in other 
industries. As with the other scenarios, 
impacts vary by country, but the mitigation 
scenario will afford gains in all LAC 
countries. Central America, Mexico, and 
the Caribbean see a larger gain in other 
industries exports compared with agro-
food exports; other LAC countries will 
see larger gains in agro-food exports. Of 
note in this scenario, Mercosur countries 
will benefit the least from intraregional 
integration given that they will not increase 
soybean exports to other LAC countries. 
However, greater integration will help 
them become less specialized and 
sensitive to their outward orientation.
Figure 6 shows the impact of the four 
scenarios on real GDP. This variable 
highlights the potential gains for some 
countries under the first two scenarios, 
and the economic contraction both 
of the region as a whole and within 
the region under the “escalating trade 
wars” scenario.” Under the mitigation 
scenario, there is a positive impact in LAC 
countries, with increases in real GDP 
ranging from 0.1 to 0.8 percent over the 
baseline in 2030.
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Final comments
How will producers and agricultural value-
chain stakeholders across the globe 
adjust their operations in anticipation 
of a potential US–China agreement or 
continuing disputes? What is the impact on 
LAC countries of trade tensions and what 
are their options for response? Knowing 
the answers to these questions can ensure 
countries can react to escalating trade 
tensions in an effective and timely manner.
Short-term effects...
LAC countries enjoy an advantage in the 
short term as the escalation of tariffs and 
reprisals between the United States and 
China will allow them to replace either 
US or Chinese exports on their reciprocal 
markets as the prices of some imports 
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Figure 6: LAC real GDP variations driven 
by trade war scenarios
Source: Authors, MIRAGRODEP CGE simulations
increase for Chinese and/or American 
consumers. The soy market provides 
a clear example. The price difference 
between US (New Orleans) and Brazilian 
(Paranagua) soybeans reached a historic 
high in September 2018. As trade 
tensions led China to replace US soybean 
imports with imports from other countries 
(Brazil and Argentina), Brazilian soybean 
prices rose and the price gap widened. 
If this situation continues, the US could 
end up with a soybean surplus that would 
drive down domestic prices and/or lead to 
dumping on other markets.
... with long-term repercussions
A prolonged period of moderate trade 
growth would affect medium-term 
productivity growth and, therefore, longer-
term growth prospects through investment 
decisions that could increase global 
distortions.
There is a risk of increased competition 
(and potential dumping) as US exporters 
increase exports to LAC and displace 
producers within LAC as demand contracts 
and quantities exported from LAC to China 
fall and commodity prices drop.
Taking the soy market as an example 
again, two possible long-term outcomes 
merit attention. First, as the Mercosur 
countries expand their export and storage 
capabilities, they can increasingly store 
agricultural products into the US harvest 
period, reducing the pressure to sell 
immediately. Second, the US soybean 
industry could expand its production 
capabilities.
What should be the region’s 
strategy to manage this situation?
The impact in Latin America of the US–
China trade dispute and the resulting 
reordering of the world economy forces 
us to think of new strategies. While the 
level of intra-LAC heterogeneity could be 
a major challenge to defining a collective 
action agenda, it could also be a great 
asset. As our modeling exercise shows, 
an effective LAC mitigation strategy 
could help the region avoid the negative 
impacts of current trade tensions. 
Components of the mitigation strategy 
could include intraregional preferential 
trade agreements and investments to 
reduce transportation costs. Additionally, 
harmonization of phytosanitary 
regulations and food quality standards 
could contribute to increased intraregional 
trade and thus improve resilience to 
external trade shocks.
While pushing to strengthen the 
multilateral systems with like-minded 
countries, LAC countries should embark 
on a proactive strategy for greater 
integration within the region as a tool 
to mitigate the negative effects of trade 
tensions as well as a development 
strategy.
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